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 الةـملخص الرس
 
 شيخ أوغليمحمد معتز فراس     :الاسم
 
 ة من أجل زيادة وثوقية الدارات التركيبيةرالمتكر اتمخطط عام لاستخدام الوحد    :العنوان
 
 هندسة الحاسب الآلي   التخصص:
 
 2012 تشرين الأول  تاريخ الدرجة العلمية:
 
لا تزال الأجهزة النانوية آخذة بالتقلص مع مررور الوقرتإ افرافة الرل تطلبهرا الرل جهرد تشرويل أقرل وتررددات عمرل 
أعلل. هذا ما جعلها أكثر عرفة للمؤثرات الخارجية وأصرب  مرن سرماتها ارت راد معردلات الخطرن الديناميكيرة. لحرل 
اسع في زيادة وثوقية الدارات التركيبية. وقد قمنا فري هذه المشكلة سنلجن لتقنيات التكرارإ فهي تستخدم علل نطاق و
الأخطاء اللينة (أو الديناميكية) بالاعتماد علل تقنيات التكرار وعلل احتمالات الحالة فد وثوقية البحثنا هذا بتحسين 
ة من أجرل زيرادة وثوقيرة الردارات رالمتكر اتعلل مخارج هذه الدارات. يقترح البحث مخططا ًعاما ًلاستخدام الوحد
التركيبيةإ وسيبحث افافة الل ذلك في عردة جوانرب متعلقرة بتطبيرق هرذا المخطرط. ويشرتمل ذلرك علرل ث ثرة أمرور  
والمقارنرة برين حمايرة مخررج واحرد لقراء حمايرة مخرارج متعرددة.  إأنواد الوحدات المتكررةإ تعقيرد منطرق التصرحي 
الوحدات المتكرررة. ويههرر تحليرل الوثوقيرة  ستخدامهجية لتطبيق المخطط العام لاسنقوم ع وة علل ذلك بتطوير من
علرل أن المنهجيرة المقترحرة قرادرة علرل تحقيرق  19htnySGLالذي تم اجرائه لردارات مرجعيرة عردة مرن مجموعرة 
الوحردات  فريفقرد حققنرا وفررات كبيررة  إوثوقية أعلل مرن تلرك التري يحققهرا تكررار الوحردات الث ثري. وعلرل العمروم
 فافة الل تحقيق الوثوقية العالية.المفافة باستخدام المنهجية المقترحة بالإالمتكررة 
Chapter 1
Introduction
In future nano-scale technology, studies indicate that high-density chips, up to an
order of 1012 devices/cm2 [7], will be increasingly accompanied by manufacturing
defects and susceptible to dynamic faults during chip operation [8][9]. The re-
duced noise margin of nano-scale devices increases the effect of external fault sources
such as electromagnetic interferences, thermal perturbations, and cosmic radiations.
Moreover, operating at low voltages and high frequencies makes these devices more
fragile and sensitive to environmental influences. Essentially, fault tolerant designs
are required for reliable systems that will operate correctly in spite of transient
dynamic faults. All fault tolerance approaches rely on some sort of redundancy;
otherwise, there will be no way to tell that a device has changed its state.
1
21.1 Motivation
In nanometric technologies, circuits are increasingly sensitive to various kinds of
perturbations. Soft errors, a concern in the past for space applications, become a
reliability issue at ground level. Alpha particles and atmospheric neutrons induce
single-event upsets affecting memory cells, latches, and flip-flops, and single-event
transients initiated in the combinational logic and captured by the associated latches
and flip-flops. To overcome this challenge, a designer must utilize a variety of soft
error mitigation schemes adapted to various circuit structures, design architectures,
and design constraints [10].
The soft error rate (SER) produced by these effects may exceed the failure in time
(FIT) specifications in various application domains. In such applications, soft-error
mitigation schemes should be employed for both memories and logic. Duplication
and comparison such as triple modular redundancy (TMR) and majority voting,
or more generally, N-modular redundancy (NMR) proposed by Von Neumann [11]
are the most commonly used solutions for reducing SER induced by SEUs and
SETs in logic parts. Many researches have investigated increasing the reliability
of circuits using redundancy schemes. Their main concern is to increase reliability
while minimizing the inevitable overhead of area, power, or time. In this work, we
are targeting the reliability issue in the logic based on probabilities of signals and
output states. We will make use of this information to build up a reliable version
3from the original circuit, while maintaining the minimum possible area overhead
based on a generalized modular redundancy scheme.
1.2 Problem Statement
Given a combinational logic circuit, our aim is to increase the reliability of this
circuit against soft errors using a generalized modular redundancy scheme, while
maintaining minimum area overhead.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
The contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• Develop a generalized modular redundancy scheme to enhance the reliability of
combinational logic circuits against soft errors based on probabilities of states
at their outputs.
• Investigate different aspects concerning the application of the generalized mod-
ular redundancy scheme. This includes types of redundant modules, complex-
ity of voters and single versus multiple outputs protection.
• Develop a methodology for applying the generalized modular redundancy
scheme to increase the reliability of combinational logic circuits with variety
of sizes.
41.4 Thesis Organization
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 starts with a background about dif-
ferent types of faults and their models. Different soft error mitigation methods
are also discussed. This includes hardened storage cells, modular redundancy and
circuit-level time redundancy.
Chapter 3 introduces the generalized modular redundancy (GMR) concept. In
Chapter 4, we start by discussing various aspects concerning the application of the
generalized modular redundancy scheme. Based on that, the developed methodol-
ogy of applying GMR to enhance the reliability of combinational circuits is then
presented.
In Chapter 5, we present the work flow which has been followed to improve
fault tolerance of combinational circuits. Fault model and reliability evaluation
methodology along with simulation environment are also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 6 provides some analyses and evaluations of different aspects about the
proposed methodology. Reliability results of various benchmarks are also reported.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this work and suggests future work.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Errors, Faults, and Types of Faults
As stated in [12], we term an internal state of a system an erroneous state when
there exist circumstances in which further processing, by the normal algorithms of
the system, will lead to a failure. The term “error” is used to designate that part
of the state which is “incorrect.” An error is thus an item of information; and the
terms error, error detection, and error recovery are used as equivalents for erroneous
state, erroneous state detection, and erroneous state recovery.
A fault is the mechanical or algorithmic cause of an error, while a potential fault
is a mechanical or algorithmic construction within a system such that (under some
circumstances within the specification of the use of the system) the construction
will cause the system to assume an erroneous state. Faults due to hardware com-
5
6ponent failures, are often classified by duration, extent, and value. Duration refers
to whether the fault is permanent or transient; extent applies to whether the effect
of the fault is localized or distributed; and value indicates whether the fault creates
fixed or varying erroneous logical values.
2.2 Fault Models
In engineering, models are used to bridge the gap between the physical reality and
mathematical abstraction. They allow the development of analytical tools. There-
fore, they are essential in the design process. Modeling of faults is highly related to
the modeling of the circuit. Generally, the level refers to the degree of abstraction.
Thus, the behavioral level has fewer implementation details, and fault models at
this level may have no obvious correlation to manufacturing defects. The register-
transfer level (RTL) or logic level consists of a netlist of gates. Stuck-at faults at
this level are the most popular fault models in digital testing. Other faults at this
level are bridging faults and delay faults. Transistor and other lower levels, which
referred to as component levels, include stuck-open and stuck-short types of faults.
Considering a MOS transistor as an ideal switch, a defect is modeled as the switch
being permanently in either the open or the shorted state. This fault model assumes
only one transistor to be stuck-open or stuck-short. Stuck-short is also referred to
as stuck-on or stuck-closed. These models were proposed by Case [13].
7Stuck-at faults are modeled by assigning a fixed (0 or 1) value to a signal line in
the circuit. A signal line can be an input or an output of a logic gate or a flip-flop.
The most popular forms are the single stuck-at faults, i.e., a line can have two faults:
stuck-at-1 and stuck-at-0. There are three assumptions assumed for single stuck-at
faults: (1) only one line is faulty, (2) the faulty line is permanently set to either 0
or 1, and (3) the fault can be at an input or output of a gate. In general, several
stuck-at faults can be simultaneously present in a circuit. A circuit with n lines
can have (3n − 1) possible stuck line combinations. This is because each line can
be in one of the three states: stuck-at-1, stuck-at-0, or fault-free. All combinations
except one, having all lines in fault-free states, are counted as faults. It is clearly
evident that even a moderate value of n will give an enormously large number of
multiple stuck-at faults. For this reason, it is a common practice to model only
single stuck-at faults, where an n-line circuit can have at most 2n single stuck-at
faults [14]. In addition, a large percentage of multiple stuck-at faults are detected
by single stuck-at fault tests.
2.3 Fault Avoidance and Fault Tolerance
The traditional approach to achieving reliable computing systems has been based
largely on fault avoidance (termed fault intolerance by Avizienis [15]) which in-
cludes: utilization of the most reliable components, elimination of expected forms
8of interference and carrying out of comprehensive testing to eliminate hardware and
software design faults. Many recent methods have been proposed to perform fault
avoidance through reconfiguration. These methods are classified into two groups:
(1) Hardware-oriented methods, where a faulty basic element (BE) is automatically
swapped with a spare using additional wires, switches, and controllers, along the re-
placement policy. (2) Reconfiguration-oriented, where reconfigurability is exploited
for fault avoidance with partial mapping modification [16].
An alternative approach to fault avoidance is that of fault tolerance. This ap-
proach involves the use of protective redundancy. A system can be designed to be
fault tolerant by incorporating additional components and special algorithms, which
attempt to ensure that occurrences of erroneous states do not result in later system
failures. The degree of fault tolerance depends on the success with which erroneous
states, which corresponds to faults, are identified and detected, and the success with
which such states are repaired or replaced [12].
The objective of fault tolerance is either to mask, or to recover from, faults once
they have been detected [17]. Many researches on reliable systems are concerned
with the detection of faults using error detecting and correcting codes or fault de-
tecting and self repairing circuits. The tolerance itself is achieved using redundancy
techniques.
92.4 Soft Errors
When high-energy neutrons (present in terrestrial cosmic radiation) or alpha parti-
cles (originating from impurities in the packaging materials) strike a sensitive region
in a semiconductor, they generate a dense local track of electron-hole pairs. These
electron-hole pairs are then collected at a p-n junction, and create a single event
transient (SET). This unexpected current pulse of a short duration, under some
conditions, may be misinterpreted by the circuit as a valid signal, and result in an
incorrect state or output, thus producing a soft error [3]. As this type of faults does
not reflect a permanent failure, hence soft or transient terms are used.
Historically, soft errors have been of great concern in memory cells, that are
much more susceptible to particle strikes than combinational logic, where SET are
frequently masked before reaching an output or a storage element [18] [19]. However,
technological trends such as faster clock rates, smaller device sizes, lower supply
voltages, and shallower logic depths are drastically reducing SET masking, and
remarkably increasing the occurrence of soft errors in combinational logic [20]. The
single event transient may propagate through the combinational logic, and errors
may or may not reach a storage element or an output depending on the following
factors [21]:
Logical masking: The hazard may not propagate because there is not any sen-
sitized path from the node where the strike happened to any output of the
10
combinational logic circuit.
Temporal masking: As the hazard propagates towards a sequential element, it
will form a sort of noise on the data input of that sequential element. This
noise may reach the sequential element outside its latching window. Hence,
the error will not be latched and there will be no soft error.
Electrical masking: Since all CMOS circuits have limited bandwidths, hazards
with bandwidths greater than the cut-off frequency will be attenuated. The
amplitude of the hazard pulse will be reduced, and eventually the hazard pulse
may disappear. However, since most logic gates are nonlinear circuits with a
substantial voltage gain, low-frequency pulses with sufficient initial amplitude
will be amplified [22].
As stated earlier, with the increase in clock rates, and the reduction in both feature
sizes and supply voltages the effect of those masking is becoming more limited.
The most deceitful form of single event transient errors is silent data corruption
(SDC), where a fault causes the system to produce erroneous outputs. To avoid
silent data corruption, designers often employ basic error detection mechanisms,
such as parity. With the ability to detect a fault but not correct it, we can avoid
generating incorrect outputs, but cannot recover when an error happens. That is
to say, error detection mechanism does not reduce the overall error rate, but does
provide fail-stop behavior and thereby avoids any data corruption. Such errors are
11
categorized as detected unrecoverable errors (DUE) in [23].
There are two techniques that can be used to reduce soft errors impact: (1)
error detection and retry and (2) error masking. Error detection and retry involves
using on-line error detection circuitry [24] [25] [26] which monitors the outputs of a
circuit for the occurrence of an error. If an error is observed, the system recovers
through rollback and retry, therefore preventing a fault from happening. Error mask-
ing employs circuitry that masks errors using schemes such as: quadded logic [27],
interwoven logic [28], and triple modular redundancy (TMR) [26]. For real-time sys-
tems, it may not be possible to do error detection and retry, therefore error masking
is the only available choice. Sometimes, the cost of implementing error detection
and retry may be comparable to that of implementing error masking schemes [3].
2.5 Soft Error Rate
Currently, the industry specifies soft error rates in terms of silent data corruption
(SDC) and detected unrecoverable errors (DUE) numbers. Both SDC and DUE
rates are typically expressed in FIT (Failure(s) in Time). One FIT expresses one
error in a billion (109) hours. FIT rates are additive, so we can compute the SDC
or DUE FIT rate of a chip or a system by summing the SDC or DUE FIT rates of
all its components. The sum of SDC and DUE FIT is usually referred to as the soft
error rate (SER) of a chip [23]. The additive property of FIT makes it convenient for
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calculations. However, mean time to failure (MTTF) is another important indicator.
MTTF is inversely related to FIT. A FIT rate of 1000 is equivalent to MTTF of 114
years (109/(1000× 24× 365)). Vendors usually set soft error rate budgets for their
chips or systems based on target market requirements. For example, IBM targets
114 SDC FIT (1000 yr MTTF), for its Power4 systems [29].
Soft error rate (SER) estimation can be performed at different levels of design
hierarchies, through modeling soft errors across the device, logic, and architectural
levels. Device level abstracts the soft error impact as a transient pulse waveform.
Soft errors are modeled by using nuclear and device physics tools, with an aim of
creating a transient current waveform library that captures different process and
operating conditions that impact the soft error rate. SPICE simulation is usually
used to obtain the estimation at this level of abstraction. At the logic level, estima-
tion of SER is based on attempting to capture electrical, logic, and latch window
masking models. This can be used next to compute SET occurrence rate, the error
propagation probability (EPP), and the error latching probability. Architectural
level solutions may be more effective than circuit or logic level solutions, because
the definition of what constitutes an error typically lies in the architecture. For
example, in microprocessor architecture, a strike on a branch prediction unit does
not result in an error in the microprocessor.
13
Figure 2.1: Example of hardened storage cells: DICE [1].
2.6 Soft Error Mitigation
Radiation affects logic due to single event transient in combinational logic and sin-
gle event upset in sequential cells. Solutions for these effects comprise hardened
sequential cells, self-checking design, modular redundancy, and circuit-level time
redundancy.
2.6.1 Hardened Storage Cells
Hardened storage cells like SRAM cells, latches, and flip-flops preserve their state
even if the state of one of their nodes is altered by a transient soft error. Several
hardened storage cells have been proposed in the literature. Figure 2.1 shows the
DICE cell [1] which is robust against any single event disturbing a single node of
the cell.
Another hardening approach is proposed in [30]. In [2] this solution was adapted
to implement a new memory cell. This proposed hardening design makes use of 11
CMOS transistors. The proposed hardened memory cell overcomes the problems
14
Figure 2.2: 11-transistor nanoscale CMOS memory cell [2].
associated with the previous designs by utilizing novel access and refreshing mech-
anisms. The cell was shown to provide similar protection against SEUs as DICE
while requiring 20% less area and a 55% reduction of speed-power product. Details
of several hardened cells can be found in [31].
2.6.2 Modular Redundancy
Protecting combinational logic is a complex task when compared to protecting mem-
ories, latches, and flip-flops, and may involve quite high hardware cost. Therefore,
it is mandatory to properly select the protection scheme in order to meet design
requirements in terms of area, speed, power and reliability. Redundancy techniques
(duplication and comparison) such as triple modular redundancy (TMR) [26] are a
possible solution for masking errors produced in the logic, despite its high area and
power penalty. TMR is a special case of the generalized NMR system. An NMR
system is a system that consists of N identical modules which are fed to a majority
15
Figure 2.3: Block diagram for TMR-based error masking [3].
voter. TMR is a system where N = 3, which consists of three identical modules
whose outputs are voted on.
If 2 out of 3 modules produce the same results, this implies that the majority
of the modules produce correct results and the system will be functioning correctly.
In TMR, all the three identical modules perform the same operation, and a voter
accepts outputs from all three modules, producing a majority vote at its output as
shown in Figure 2.3. TMR is heavily used in practice whenever the reliability of
the circuit is a crucial demand, especially when single faults are needed to be pro-
tected. Recently, Xilinx introduced its triple module redundancy technology which
is developed to address the special requirements of FPGAs in high-radiation envi-
ronments. Designed for space applications and proven through numerous mission-
critical projects, TMR provides full SEU and SET immunity for any Virtex-4 space-
grade FPGA design. This technique automatically builds TMR into Xilinx FPGA
designs, providing complete SEU and SET protection [32].
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2.6.3 Error Detection using Checkers
Another approach is to extend the function of the combinational blocks to generate
error detection code outputs in addition to their regular outputs, and use a code
checker to detect errors [33]. The general idea for achieving error detection and
correction is to add some redundancy (i.e., some extra bits), which afterward can
be used to check consistency of the output bits, and to recover bits determined
erroneous. Checkers used this concept to detect if an output codeword is incorrect
and correct it if possible [34]. Parity check, cyclic redundancy check (CRC) and
Checksum are types of redundancy checks used in data communication for error
detection. Forward error correction is an example of error correction. In theory it is
possible to correct any error, however error correcting codes are more sophisticated
than error detection codes and require more redundancy bits.
2.6.4 Circuit-Level Time Redundancy
A first scheme proposed in [35] [36] uses double sampling to observe an output of a
combinational circuit at two different instants. This is done by adding a redundant
latch to each circuit output, and driving the redundant latches by using a delayed
clock signal, as shown in Figure 2.4. The delayed clock can be produced by adding
some delay elements on the normal clock signal. Another more efficient alternative
is to use the two edges or the two levels of the clock signal to activate the regular
17
Figure 2.4: A detection technique using a redundant latch and a delayed clock.
and the redundant storage element. Upon error detection, the latest operation has
to be repeated (retry). Also, as suggested in [35], to avoid the occurrence of the
same error in case of timing faults, the clock frequency is reduced during retry.
In this double sampling scheme, the delay element δ can be added on the combi-
national circuit output rather than on the clock as in [35] [36]. This creates a second
sampling instant that precedes by δ the regular sampling instant. As we can see,
for real-time systems, it may not be possible to do error detection and retry, thus
error masking and online error detection and correction are the preferable options.
2.7 Related Work
In a work done by Mohanram et al. [3], two soft error rate reduction heuristics
were introduced. They are cluster sharing reduction and dominant value reduction.
Cluster sharing reduction is based upon two observations. The first is that soft error
susceptibility of certain nodes in the logic circuit can be orders of magnitude higher
than that of other nodes in the design. The second is that these nodes tend to be
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clustered together. Thus, the cluster sharing reduction heuristic involves selecting
such clusters of nodes (with low soft error susceptibility), so that the clusters’ logic
can be shared across the three copies used to realize TMR. The clusters are removed
from two out of the three copies of the TMR design and they are driven by the cluster
from a single copy only. If a particle strike occurs in the non-triplicated portion of
the design, it will (in the presence of a sensitized path) propagate to the outputs of
all three copies and thus goes undetected. However, any particle strike that occurs
on a node in the triplicated logic portion of the circuit will be masked by the 2-
out-of-3 voter. Therefore, by carefully selecting the clusters of nodes with low soft
error susceptibility, nodes with the highest soft error susceptibility will be in the
triplicated logic portion of the circuit, thereby giving a cost-effective reduction in
the soft error failure rate.
Dominant value reduction is the second technique, and it works as follows. First
of all, the soft error failure rates at the outputs of the circuit are computed, where
each of the primary outputs has either logic 0 or logic 1. For example, let primary
output Oi has a logic 1 failure rate that is an order of magnitude higher than its
logic 0 failure rate. Then, the authors consider the approach to error masking where
just two copies of the logic circuit are used, and the 2-out-of-3 majority voter is
replaced by an OR gate as shown in Figure 2.5. Any particle strike that causes
a 1 → 0 → 1 transient to appear at the output Oi is guaranteed to be masked.
However, a 0 → 1 → 0 transient will not be masked. Thus, while the logic 1 failure
19
Figure 2.5: Example of dominant value reduction for error masking [3].
Figure 2.6: Partial error masking scheme [3].
rate of the primary output Oi is reduced to 0, the logic 0 failure rate is not. However,
since the logic 1 failure rate is an order of magnitude higher than the logic 0 failure
rate, the reduction in failure rate is considerably high.
These two reduction procedures are then combined to form the partial error
masking scheme. It starts with a TMR realization for error masking that is first
reduced using cluster sharing. The soft error failure rate of the resulting implemen-
tation is then estimated along with the area overhead. Dominant value masking is
then used to further reduce area overhead. Figure 2.6 depicts partial error masking
scheme.
Another similar approach to the dominant value reduction is also proposed by
Krishnaswamy et al. in [37]. Their proposed technique increases logic masking
20
at high-impact nodes by exploiting redundancy already present in the circuit as
identified by covering relationships among existing nodes. Just like partial TMR,
which replicates vulnerable nodes, this technique incurs a smaller area overhead as
it increases logic masking through the addition of single gates. In their work, they
use the notation f ⊆ g when g covers f , i.e., g is 1 for every input vector that makes
f = 1. This relation is then generalized to:
f&C(g) ⊆ g&C(g) (2.1)
Here C(g) =∼ ODC(g), is the Boolean function representing the care set of g.
In other words, g covers f if and only if g is 1 or a don’t-care wherever f is 1. They
define node g to be an anti-cover of node f when:
g&C(g) ⊆ f&C(g) (2.2)
Based on the idea that nodes’ influence on SER is proportional to the probability
that faults arrive at the node, and the probability that those faults are observed as
errors at the output, they compute the impact of each gate. Then, for a high-
impact node x, they find other nodes that it covers or anti-covers. So, given a
candidate node y covered by x, they add redundant logic by transforming node x
into OR(x, y) because y ⊆ x implies OR(x, y) = x. Similarly, if x is an anti-cover
of y, they transform node x into AND(x, y).
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In [38], the authors proposed a method for reliability improvement based on
modular redundancy schemes. This method selects the best subset among possible
redundant architectures. It is built upon the progressive module redundancy tech-
nique and the block grading concept. To understand the block grading concept,
let us consider a circuit which consists of a certain number K of blocks b1, b2, . .
., bK . The reliability of each block bi is denoted by qi. The reliability of such a
circuit R depends on the reliabilities of its constituent blocks. By improving the
reliability of a single block bi as in Equation 2.3, the reliability of the circuit will be
improved as in Equation 2.4. ∆qi stands for the individual reliability improvement
of block bi. Likewise, ∆Ri expresses the global reliability increase due to reliability
improvement of block bi. ∆Ri scales with the weight (noted wi) of ∆qi in the new
global reliability calculation. The greater wi is, the greater the ∆Ri will be. The wi
values are integers in the range [1, K].
q+i = qi +∆qi (2.3)
R+i = Ri +∆Ri (2.4)
Efficiency is achieved by taking into account grades of blocks with respect to
reliability, by adding redundancy progressively and by considering mixed modular
redundancy. The idea is to add redundancy first on the blocks that have higher
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weights, because they contribute to higher reliability improvements, and then on the
blocks with lower weights. The proposed method presents a shortcut by avoiding
analyses of all the possible redundant architectures exhaustively. This method is
not constrained on TMR but extends to 5MR. Compared with previous works such
as selective module redundant techniques described in [39], the proposed method
does not need to analyze the logic implications of each logic gate, and it could be
combined with other soft error mitigation techniques at logic and circuit level.
In [40] the authors present a design technique for hardening circuits mapped
onto FPGAs. They detect SEU sensitive gates of a given circuit based on signal
probabilities; the signal probability of a line is the probability of this line having a
value of 1. After characterizing the input environment, input signals probabilities
are then propagated to compute the signal probability of each internal node at the
gate level. A gate is identified as a sensitive gate if its SEU sensitive probability
is greater than the threshold specified by the user. Triple modular redundancy is
then introduced for each sensitive gate. Additionally, a majority voter is introduced
between gates depending on the fanout connections of these sensitive gates. The
effectiveness of selectively introducing TMR for SEU mitigation is highly dependant
on input signal probabilities and the nature of the circuit. The advantage of selective
TMR is clear for those circuits wherein the size of the SEU sensitive sub-circuit is
much smaller compared to the original circuit.
In [4], the authors introduced the idea of increasing sequential circuit reliability
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Figure 2.7: Incorrect encoding for 3 states with redundancy [4].
by introducing redundant equivalent states to states with high probability of occur-
rence in sequential circuit finite state machine. To maintain the same operation of
the original FSM, the newly added redundant states have the same input, next state,
and output as the original states. Other states with low probability are kept without
protection to minimize the area overhead. The authors divided the original states of
the state machine into protected states with high probability of occurrence, and nor-
mal states with low probability of occurrence. For each protected state, equivalent
redundant states are added to guarantee single soft fault tolerance. The analysis of
the problem suggests that the following requirements have to be met:
• The Hamming distance between protected states codes should be at least 3.
• The Hamming distance between codes of normal states and protected states
should be at least 2.
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Figure 2.8: Correct encoding for 3 states with redundancy [4].
These requirements are a must in order to be able to add redundant states
without code overlapping with protected or normal stats. To illustrate this, let us
assume that 3 states need to be protected with no normal states. Thus, using only 4-
bits to encode them will result in overlapping between some of the redundant states.
Figure 2.7 shows that states A and C have the same redundant states namely, 0100
and 1000. Similarly, states B and C have the same redundant states namely, 1101
and 1110. Therefore, the correct encoding is to use 5-bits instead of 4-bits. One
possible encoding is shown in Figure 2.8.
The author developed an algorithm to determine the number of bits needed to
encode protected, redundant, and normal states; the algorithm will also provide
states’ codes. He found that failure rate of sequential circuits which involves pro-
tecting states with high probability of occurrence is less than the ones involving
protecting random or lower state probability. For more details about the work, you
25
can refer to [4].
The authors in [5] suggest that simple replication of micro-architecture modules
will no longer suffice, as all replicated modules will have faults. As a result, designers
will have to devise a method for operating with defective structures, given that all
the structures will have defects. In [41], the authors introduce the concept of history
index of correct computation (HICC), where they developed a technique to tolerate
the expected flawed nano-chips at run time. The HICC is a measure of a hardware
unit’s reliability. The HICC module transmits the correct computation based on
the history indices of redundant units that implement the identical function. The
redundant unit with the highest history index is considered to be the most reliable
one, and is selected to transmit its computation. Other redundant units that imple-
ment the same function are considered unreliable, and their computation is ignored.
The history index of every redundant unit is updated based on majority voting.
To demonstrate how the HICC concept works, consider three copies of an 8-bit
ALU with no error correction or detection which are depicted in Figure 2.9 as units
A, B and C. A decision unit is located inside the HICC module. The result selector,
decision unit, receives results from the three identical units along with their stored
history indices, and decides which result is correct, based on the one with the highest
history index. The result from the unit with the highest index is transmitted. In
this way, computation is based on correct computation history rather than merely
on some voting process. The history index is updated based on bitwise majority
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Figure 2.9: HICC module [5].
voting. The history index of each of the redundant units is incremented by 1 when
its computation is identical to that of the majority and is decremented by 1 when
it is not.
Moreover, maximizing the reliability of a system based on nano-devices may
require a combination of techniques [42]. Previous results that used error correcting
codes (ECCs) and TMR at the bit and module levels demonstrated that recursive
TMR at both levels has the best resilience to noise [43]. Thus, they combined
redundancy and reconfiguration to make the system more tolerant of faults. To
increase the fault tolerance of the error-prone decision units at the module level, a
second copy of the result is stored with an additional parity bit, as illustrated in
Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11. The parity checker transmits the even parity result.
History indices also have an additional parity bit. The index is updated if even
parity is detected. They have stated that without such extra redundancy at the
module level, HICC performance is deteriorated.
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Figure 2.10: Enhanced majority voting with parity checking at the module level [5].
Figure 2.11: Enhanced HICC unit with parity checking at the module level [5].
In [6], the authors investigate defect tolerance based on adding redundancy at
the transistor-level for electronic circuits. Their work is focused on transistor stuck-
open, stuck-short and bridges between gates of transistors. In order to tolerate
single defective transistors, each transistor, A, is replaced by a quadded-transistor
structure implementing either the logic function (A+A)(A+A) or the logic function
(AA) + (AA). In both of the quadded-transistor structures, any single transistor
28
defect (stuck-open, stuck-short, AND/OR-bridge) will not change the logic behavior,
and hence the defect is tolerated.
Figure 2.12: Defect-tolerant N2-transistor structure [6].
The quadded-transistor structure is then generalized to an N2-transistor struc-
ture, where N ≥ 2. An N2-transistor structure is composed of N blocks connected
in series with each block composed of N parallel transistors, as shown in Figure 2.12.
An N2-transistor structure guarantees defect tolerance of all defects of multiplicity
less than or equal to (N − 1) in the structure. Hence, a large number of multi-
ple defects can be tolerated in a circuit implemented based on these structures.
As demonstrated by the authors, the investigated technique achieves significantly
higher defect tolerance than recently reported nanoelectronics defect-tolerant tech-
niques (even with up to 4 to 5 times more transistor defect probability) and at
reduced area overhead.
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In [44], two algorithms for the selective assignment of input don’t cares (DCs)
are proposed to enhance input error resilience. The authors focused on input errors
due to propagated failures from previous blocks. Both algorithms determine 0/1 as-
signments for the most critical DC terms. This work is motivated by the observation
that reliability-driven assignment of DCs can improve input error resilience in logic
circuits. They showed that selective reliability-driven DC assignment can enhance
robustness and avoid the high overheads associated with complete reliability-driven
DC assignment.
In [45], the authors introduced the idea of synthesizing combinational circuits to
increase their tolerance for soft errors. Their idea is based on extracting sub-circuits
from the original multi-level circuit and re-synthesizing each extracted sub-circuit
to increase fault masking. After that, the re-synthesized sub-circuits are merged
back to the original circuit. As a result, the overall reliability of the original circuit
is enhanced. The proposed scheme provides a heuristic that first finds the best
irredundant set of cubes to cover an extracted sub-circuit minterms such that fault
masking for single fault is maximized especially for minterms with high probability
of occurrence. Then, an extra number of cubes can be added as redundant cubes to
the cover such that they have a significant effect on maximizing error masking. After
that, a technique based on modification of the fast extraction algorithm is proposed
to enhance area overhead to the optimized circuits obtained in the previous step.
An average failure rate reduction of 26% is obtained compared to the original circuit
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when the number of injected faults in the new re-synthesized circuit is proportional
to area compared to original area. An average area overhead of 61% is added
compared to the original circuit.
Chapter 3
Generalized Modular Redundancy
3.1 Introduction
Given a combinational logic circuit with multiple inputs and outputs, we will use
“state” notation to denote a given output combination, Figure 3.1. Of course, each
state at the output of a circuit has a probability of occurrence. This probability is
attributable to the structure of the circuit and input vectors provided by the envi-
ronment. Based on these probabilities, we would like to increase the reliability of the
logic by protecting those states with high probability of occurrence. Protecting only
these states will help us to increase the reliability of the circuit while saving some
area overhead, by not protecting states with low probability of occurrence. This
work is an extension of a previous work for enhancing sequential circuits reliabil-
ity [4]. The author proposed a technique of protecting states with high probability
31
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Figure 3.1: States in combinational logic circuits.
of occurrence to enhance fault tolerance for sequential circuits. The protection is
done by introducing redundant states to the finite states machine (FSM). To main-
tain the same operation of the unprotected FSM, the newly added redundant states
have the same input, next state, and output as the original protected states.
3.2 Types of States
Based on their probability of occurrence, states at the primary outputs of a com-
binational logic circuit can be classified into two types: dominant states and states
which are not dominant, i.e., with low or moderate probability of occurrence. When
the probability of occurrence for a certain state is close to an order of magnitude
higher than the probability of occurrence for other states it is considered as a dom-
inant state. Inferior states are states with low probability of occurrence. Therefore,
dominant states will be considered for reliability enhancement due to their highly
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skewed susceptibility to soft errors.
3.3 Protection of Dominant States
Like the introduction of redundant states for sequential circuits [4], redundant mod-
ules have to be introduced in combinational circuits. The author devised some
requirements that have to be met:
• The Hamming distance for each pair of protected states’ codes has to be at
least 3.
• The Hamming distance between normal (unprotected) states’codes and pro-
tected states’ codes has to be at least 2.
• The combinational logic which implements each output has to be not shared
with the others.
Protected states, in sequential circuits, include original dominant states; normal
states include the remaining states in the finite state machine. In order to detect all
single errors for protected states, the Hamming distance between protected state A,
and its redundant states should be 1. Similarly for protected state B, the Hamming
distance between it and any of its redundant states should be 1. To insure that no
two states have the same code, the distance between states A and B must be kept
at least 3. For the same reason, the distance between protected and normal states
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Figure 3.2: New States after introducing redundant modules.
has to be at least 2. Finally, no logic sharing is allowed between different outputs,
so that no single error can propagate to more than one output.
As we have stated earlier, a “state” in the combinational logic denotes a given
output combination. Dominant state or states are states with high probability of
occurrence, while inferior states are states with low probability of occurrence. To
increase the reliability of the circuit, extra redundant modules will be introduced to
the logic. New states now consist of original outputs and the outputs of redundant
modules, as shown in Figure 3.2. Modules R1 and R2 are redundant modules.
Original outputs plus outputs of redundant modules will be then fed to another
logic to produce the protected outputs, as shown in Figure 3.3.
A tool was developed to satisfy the first two requirements for enhancing sequen-
tial circuits reliability [4]. In sequential circuits, codes can be assigned to any state;
so the developed tool explores the space for an assignment that meets the mentioned
requirements with a minimum number of bits. Figure 3.4 shows desired Hamming
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Figure 3.3: Protected outputs after introducing redundant modules and correction
logic.
distances between different types of states. However, in combinational logic, a state
represents an output combination. Therefore, redundant modules should be care-
fully selected in order to meet previously stated requirements. Two options are
available for adding redundant modules: original module replication and introduc-
ing new modules.
• In module replication, a redundant module is essentially a replica of one of the
original modules in the circuit. Original modules are replicated and introduced
as redundant modules. Hence, a decision has to be made to determine which
modules to be replicated and for how many times, in order to satisfy the
requirements for combinational logic.
• For newly introduced redundant modules, modules are specially customized so
that new states can satisfy the requirements. In this case, we are not limited
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Figure 3.4: Desired Hamming distance between different types of states.
by the options offered by modules replication. Instead, we might be able to
add fewer redundant modules by customizing them with respect to dominant
protected states.
3.4 Protecting Single Output
Let us consider the case of a single output circuit or one module. States at the
output are the simple state 0 (logic 0) or state 1 (logic 1). In some cases, the
probability of having one state is far more than the probability of having the other.
So, the dominant state will be selected for protection, while the other will not.
Assume that logic 0 is dominant at the output. New redundant modules have to
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be introduced to the logic. We can see that by replicating the module one time the
first two requirements are satisfied. After adding the extra module, state “0” will
become “00” and state “1” will become “11”. There is only one state to protect, so
the first requirement is already satisfied. Hamming distance between the protected
state and the other state equals to two, so the second requirement is also satisfied.
The third requirement is met while synthesizing the circuit.
If an error hits and alters the output, while the circuit is at state “00”, the re-
sulting state will be “01” or “10”. In order to obtain the protected output, both
original and redundant outputs will be fed to another logic. In this case, dominance
of state 0, it turns out that this logic is an AND gate. Any particle strike that
causes a 0 → 1 → 0 transient to appear at the output is guaranteed to be masked.
However, a 1 → 0 → 1 transient will not be masked. Therefore, logic 0 failure rate
of the primary output is reduced to 0, while logic 1 failure rate is not. Figure 3.5(a)
demonstrates these findings. The same observations can be found when the domi-
nant state is state “1”. However, the logic which will produce the protected output
is an OR gate, Figure 3.5(b). The use of these dominant values or states along with
simple voters (And, OR) has been discussed earlier in the literature [3].
Let’s consider the case where there is no dominant state at the primary output,
i.e., the probability of having state “0” is equal or close to the probability of having
state “1”. Obviously, we need to protect the two states. We can see that by replicat-
ing the module two times the first two requirements are satisfied. After adding the
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Figure 3.5: Protecting one state in single output circuits.
redundant modules, state “0” will become “000” and state “1” will become “111”.
Hamming distance between the protected states equals to three, so the first require-
ment is satisfied. We don’t have to worry about the second requirement as all states
are considered for protection. Again, to obtain the protected output, all original
and redundant outputs will be fed to another logic. Figure 3.6 shows the result of
replicating the module and the logic needed to obtain the protected output.
In this case, protecting all states, we had to replicate the original module two
times; so we ended up with three replicas. Moreover, the logic that produces the
protected output is essentially the 2-out-of-3 majority voter. So, with the purpose
of protecting all states at the primary output we ended up applying TMR, where
we have three exact copies of the original circuit plus a majority voter.
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Figure 3.6: Protecting all states in single output circuits.
Equality comparator serves as an excellent example for protecting single output
circuits. A 6-bit equality comparator has two inputs, each of which is 6-bit long. It
has a single output; the output equals to “1” if and only if the two inputs are equal.
Thus, the probability of having a “1” at the output is: Prob(1) = 26/212 = 0.015,
while the probability of having a “0” equals to: Prob(0) = 1−Prob(1) = 1−0.015 =
0.985 which is an order of magnitude greater than Prob(1). So, equality comparator
is eligible for dominant value protection. Protecting the state which is vulnerable
to soft errors the most involves adding one extra module. This will save us some
area overhead, another extra module, as opposed to TMR wherein we need two
redundant modules.
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Figure 3.7: Logic diagram of a full adder.
3.5 Protecting Multiple Outputs
In this section, we will discuss the idea of protecting multiple outputs together by
using the generalized modular redundancy (GMR) scheme. We will take the full
adder as a case study. The full adder consists of two sub-modules: Sum and Carry.
Figure 3.7 and Table 3.5 show the full adder and its truth table. By looking at
the outputs, we can observe four different output combinations or states, namely:
“00”, “01”, “10”, and “11”. It is clearly visible that some states are happening more
frequently than others, assuming that all input patterns are equally likely to happen.
Probability distribution of states at full adder’s outputs is like this: P(00) = 1/8,
P(01) = 3/8, P(10) = 3/8, and P(11) = 1/8.
Obviously, there is no one dominant state. However, by protecting more than
one state we can apply GMR scheme. Assume that we want to protect the two states
with highest probabilities of occurrence (“01” and “10”). Figure 3.8 shows that by
replicating each module (Sum and Carry) only one time the requirements mentioned
above are satisfied. After replication, states (00, 01, 10, 11) become (0000, 0011,
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Cin A1 B1 Sum Carry
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
Table 3.1: Truth table of a full adder.
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Figure 3.8: Full adder’s states after replication (protecting two states).
1100, 1111), respectively. We denote Carry and its replica as C1 and C2. Similarly,
S1 and S2 represent Sum and its duplicate.
The equations 3.1 and 3.2, show that the conditions are satisfied, where H is
the Hamming distance between two states. As a result, states which will result in
from a protected state, when a single transient error hits the logic, are guaranteed
to be disjoint from each others and from other unprotected states. The final outputs
of the protected version of the full adder can be obtained using Karnaugh-map as
shown in Figure 3.9. It is evident that the area of this logic is comparable to the
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Figure 3.9: Full adder’s protected outputs after replication (protecting two states).
area of the majority voter.
H(0011, 1100) = 4 > 3. (3.1)
H(0000, 0011) = 2, H(0000, 1100) = 2,
H(1111, 0011) = 2, H(1111, 1100) = 2.
(3.2)
What if we want to apply GMR, generally protecting portion of states, to pro-
tect all the states of a full adder? Figure 3.10 shows that in order to protect all
states we need to replicate each module two times. This will ensure that states are
disjoined. The final protected outputs are also shown in the figure. In this case,
protecting all states, we had to triplicate each module; the outputs also are identical
to the majority voters used in TMR. Accordingly, we can think of triple modular
redundancy (TMR) as a special case of our method, where we protect all states at
the output.
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Figure 3.10: Full adder’s protected outputs after replication (protecting all states).
A digital comparator serves as an excellent example for protecting multiple out-
put circuits. A 4-bit digital comparator has two inputs A and B each of which
is 4-bit long. It has two outputs. The output equals to “00” if and only if the
two inputs are equal. It equals to “10” if A is greater than B, and to “01” if
B is greater than A. Thus, the probability of having a “00” at the output is:
Prob(00) = 24/28 = 0.0625, while the probability of having a “10” or “01” equals
to: Prob(10) = Prob(01) = (1 − Prob(00))/2 = 0.46875. The protection will be
applied to states which are vulnerable to soft errors the most. This includes both
states “10” and “01”. By protecting these states, more than 93% of soft errors will
be masked.
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3.6 Why Generalized Modular Redundancy?
We have seen that the dominant value protection concept along with simple voters
“AND voter” and “OR voter” are a special case of generalized modular redundancy
(GMR) where we protect a single output circuit. Moreover, triple modular redun-
dancy (TMR) can be seen as a special case of this method, where we protect all
states at the output no matter how many outputs are protected. Hence, the name
generalized modular redundancy is used. What is more important about GMR is
the idea of protecting multiple outputs together. To clarify this point, let’s go back
to our example, the full adder. By looking at each module alone, Sum or Carry, we
can see that the probability of having a “0” is equal to the probability of having a
“1” for both modules. To protect these modules against transient soft errors, TMR
will be used as there is no dominant value. However, if we look at the outputs of the
full adder as a block, we can see that there are some dominant states (state “01”,
and state “10”). Having this in mind, we are able to increase the reliability of the
circuit by protecting these dominant states, while maintaining less area overhead.
Table 3.6 summarizes these findings.
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Circuit Num. of Modules Voter
FA (without protection) 2 -
FA (protecting 2 states) 4 special logic
FA (TMR) 6 majority voter
Eq. comparator (without protection) 1 -
Eq. comparator (protecting 1 state) 2 single gate
Eq. comparator (TMR) 3 majority voter
4-bit comparator (without protection) 2 -
4-bit comparator (protecting 2 states) 4 special logic
4-bit comparator (TMR) 6 majority voter
Table 3.2: Summary of protection methods and their area overhead.
Chapter 4
Using Generalized Modular
Redundancy to Enhance
Combinational Circuits Reliability
4.1 Introduction
We have seen that generalized modular redundancy can be used to protect states
at the output which are highly vulnerable to soft errors. The protection is applied
to single or multiple outputs by adding some redundant modules. These redundant
modules can be replicas of the original modules or some new customized modules.
Correction logic, or voters in some cases, are then needed to obtain the final pro-
tected outputs. In this chapter, we will investigate replication against introducing
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customized redundant modules, complexity of the correction logic or voters, and the
protection of single output versus multiple outputs. Based on that, the developed
methodology of applying GMR to enhance the reliability of combinational circuits
will be presented.
4.2 Module Replication against Customized Re-
dundant Modules
In module replication, a redundant module is essentially a replica of one of the
original modules in the circuit. However, newly introduced redundant modules
are specially customized modules. In order to protect states at the outputs of
combinational circuits, some requirements regarding the Hamming distance between
states have to be met. Having this issue in mind, customized redundant modules,
in some cases, are considered more flexible than replicated modules.
To explain this point, consider states at the output of a circuit with two outputs.
In order to protect states “00”, “01”, and “10” by module replication, each module
has to be replicated two times to satisfy Hamming distance requirements. However,
these requirements can be met by adding just three customized modules. Due to
the flexibility of customized redundant modules we are able to save some area over-
head. Figure 4.1 demonstrates this case, where M1 and M2 are original modules;
R1→R4 are replicated modules and C1→C3 are customized redundant modules.
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Area overhead resulting from adding customized modules is most likely to be better
or close to the overhead introduced by module replication due to existence of don’t
care conditions. Nevertheless, adding customized redundant modules requires full
description or truth table in order to be able to synthesize these modules properly.
Therefore, in this work, customized redundant modules will be used when the truth
table has a reasonable size (i.e., number of inputs ≤ 15). Otherwise, module repli-
cation will be used when the number of inputs is greater than 15. However, partial
truth tables can be used to synthesize customized redundant modules for circuits
with large number of inputs, even though this will not guarantee masking of all
faults.
For a better understanding of the difference between replicated modules and
customized redundant modules, let us take the circuit described in Figure 4.2 which
has 6 inputs and 2 outputs. State “01” has a very high probability of occurrence
P (01) = 0.95. Thus, we will attempt to protect only state “01”. In order to meet
the Hamming distance requirements at the outputs of the circuit, mentioned earlier
in Section 3.3, by using module replication both M1 and M2 modules have to be
replicated. So, we will end up with two extra modules identical to the modules of
the original circuit. However, these requirements can be easily met by adding one
customized redundant module, as depicted in Figure 4.3. In this case, we will end
up with one extra customized module. Figure 4.4 shows the synthesized version of
the circuit after adding the customized redundant module. We can notice that the
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Figure 4.1: Protecting states “00”, “01”, and “10” by: a) Module replication. b)
Customized redundant modules.
customized redundant module C1 is smaller in size than original module M2, which
is one added advantage for this type of modules where customized modules can be
smaller in size than the original modules due to existence of don’t cares, as shown in
Figure 4.3. After that, the correction logic needed to obtain the protected outputs
has to be added to the logic. Figure 4.5 shows the correction logic for modules M1
and M2.
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.i 6
.o 2
.ilb A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
.ob M1 M2
.p 64
000000 01
000001 01
000010 01
000011 01
.
.
111011 01
111100 01
111101 00
111110 10
111111 11
.e
Figure 4.2: Description of example circuit.
.i 6
.o 3
.ilb A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
.ob M1 M2 C1
.p 64
000000 010
000001 010
000010 010
000011 010
.
.
111011 010
111100 010
111101 001
111110 10-
111111 111
.e
Figure 4.3: Description of example circuit after adding a customized redundant
module.
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Figure 4.4: Example circuit after adding a customized redundant module.
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Figure 4.5: Correction logic for modules M1 and M2 in example circuit.
4.3 Complexity of Correction Logic
The idea behind GMR is to protect susceptible states against soft errors while saving
some area overhead. Two sources of overhead exist in this method: redundant mod-
ules and correction logic or voters to obtain the protected outputs. Having fewer
redundant modules is the key to saving area overhead. However, if the correction
logic or voters are complex enough, they will cause to override savings in area over-
head. For this reason, voters must be minimal in terms of area. We have seen that
only one gate (AND or OR) is needed to protect one state at a single output circuit.
A reasonable logic size is needed to protect states for circuits with two outputs. 2-
out-of-3 majority voter is used when all states at the output are protected. However,
experiments show that protecting more than two outputs together demands larger
logic to obtain the protected outputs. This may reduce the savings in area achieved
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by protecting portion of the states at the output. For this reason, we will limit the
use of GMR in this work to protect single or pair of outputs. Figure 4.6 shows the
majority voter and an example of the correction logic needed in pair protection for
the cases of protecting one, two and three states. Mi stands for original modules,
Ri stands for replicated modules and Ci stands for customized redundant modules.
Two-level logic minimization has been done to these examples by using “espresso”
tool. The size of the correction logic when protecting two states is similar to that
of the majority voter; it is smaller when only one state is protected. However, the
size becomes larger when three states are protected. This is acceptable, especially
when the size of the modules is large enough. The size of the correction logic can
be reduced further by using multilevel minimization techniques. Table 4.1 reports
the size of the correction logic, for all possible scenarios, in number of literals in the
sum of product form after using fast extraction “fx” and common cube extraction
“gcx” for multilevel minimization which are implemented in the sequential interac-
tive synthesis (SIS) package [46]. We can see that, in case of protecting one state,
the size of the correction logic is smaller than that of the majority voter. The size
of the correction logic when protecting two states is similar to the size of the major-
ity voter. However, the size of the correction logic when protecting three states is
slightly more than double the size of the majority voter. This introduces. a disad-
vantage to this technique, unless the size of circuit’s modules is large enough where
area savings obtained by GMR can compensate the extra overhead introduced by
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Majority voters:
{P_M1} = M1 R1 + M1 R2 + R1 R2
{P_M2} = M2 R3 + M2 R4 + R3 R4
Correction logic (protecting one state):
{P_M1} = C1 M1 + M1 M2
{P_M2} = C1 M2 + M1 M2
Correction logic (protecting two states):
{P_M1} = C1 C2 M2’ + C1 M1 + C2 M1 M2’ + C2’ M1 M2
{P_M2} = C2 M1’ M2 + C2’ M1 M2
Correction logic (protecting three states):
{P_M1} = C1 C2 C3 M2’ + C1 C2 M1 + C1 C3 M1 M2’ + C2 C3 M1 M2’ + C3’ M1 M2
{P_M2} = C1’ C2 C3 M1’ + C1’ C2 M2 + C1’ C3 M1’ M2 + C2 C3 M1’ M2 + C3’ M1 M2
Figure 4.6: Majority voter and correction logic for pair protection (with two-level
minimization).
the correction logic.
In regard to pair protection, the number of redundant modules is proportional
to the number of protected states at the outputs. For example, if we want to protect
one state at two outputs circuit or sub-circuit, one customized redundant module has
to be added to the logic. If we are to protect two states, two customized redundant
modules have to be introduced to meet Hamming distance requirements. Protect-
ing three states will involve the addition of three customized redundant modules.
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 depict all possible protection scenarios, where states above the
dotted line are the protected states; notations Mi and Ci are used to designate orig-
inal modules and customized redundant modules, respectively. It is clearly visible
that in all these cases area overhead savings will be achieved. Protecting one state
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Scenario Lits(sop)
Protecting state “00” 8
Protecting state “01” 7
Protecting state “10” 7
Protecting state “11” 6
Protecting states “00” & “01” 15
Protecting states “00” & “10” 15
Protecting states “00” & “11” 14
Protecting states “01” & “10” 13
Protecting states “01” & “11” 16
Protecting states “10” & “11” 16
Protecting states “00” & “01” & “10” 28
Protecting states “00” & “01” & “11” 26
Protecting states “00” & “10” & “11” 26
Protecting states “01” & “10” & “11” 26
Majority voter for two outputs 12
Table 4.1: Size of correction logic after multilevel minimization for all possible sce-
narios of pair protection.
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saves three modules and protecting two states saves two modules in comparison to
TMR. Even when protecting three states out of four, we are still able to save a
module.
4.3.1 Masking of Correction Logic
One more aspect about correction logic is its ability to mask errors originating in
the modules. In the first place, correction logic is designed to mask single errors.
However, the majority voter for a certain output is independent from any other
output and depends only on the module producing this output in addition to its
redundant modules. While in pair protection, the correction logic of both outputs
depends on all original and redundant modules. So, for a pair of outputs in TMR,
the majority voters have a masking probability of (6 + 9)/(26− 1) = 0.238, where a
single error might happen within any of the six modules (2 original + 4 redundant
modules) or two errors each occurring in one of the modules belonging to each output
(1 original + 2 redundant modules), as they are independent. For a pair of outputs
in GMR single-output protection, the correction logic has a masking probability
of (4 + 4)/(24 − 1) = 0.53, where a single error might happen within any of the
four modules (2 original + 2 redundant modules) or two errors each occurring in
one of the modules belonging to each output (1 original + 1 redundant module),
as they are independent. For GMR output pair protection, the correction logic
when protecting one state has a masking probability of 3/(23 − 1) = 0.429, where
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Figure 4.7: a) One customized redundant module to protect one state. b) Two
customized redundant modules to protect two states.
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Figure 4.8: Three customized redundant modules to protect three states.
a single error might happen in one of the modules (2 original + 1 redundant). The
probability of masking when protecting two states equals to 4/(24 − 1) = 0.267, as
there are 4 modules (2 original + 2 redundant). Finally, the probability of masking
when protecting three states equals to 5/(25 − 1) = 0.161, as there are 5 modules
(2 original + 3 redundant). As a result, this analysis adds more advantage to GMR
single-output protection in addition to pair protection when one or two states are
protected. On the contrary, the probability of masking for the correction logic is
less than that of the majority voter when three states are protected in GMR pair
protection.
The probability of masking for the case of GMR has to be multiplied by the
probability of state protection. So, the overall probability of masking for TMR is
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1 − Pe + Pe × Pm. While, it is 1 − Pe + Pe × Ps × Pm for GMR. Where, Pe is the
probability of having an error in the circuit represented by its modules, Pm is the
probability of masking and Ps is the probability of state protection. The probability
of having an error in the module of an output differs between TMR and GMR. It
should be less in GMR due to the use of customized redundant modules where the
area is probably less; thanks to existing don’t cares.
Having don’t care conditions in customized redundant modules, as shown in
Figures 4.7 and 4.8, can add more fault tolerance in the circuit. When there is a
don’t care in an unprotected state, we don’t have to care about the value of the
redundant module, as the Hamming distance requirements are already met. So,
even if a transient error appeared at this extra module, we can still have a correct
result at the output of the correction logic. This also is shown in Figure 4.5. If the
don’t care is present in a state that is not protected this makes us tolerate errors
in the customized module. However, if the don’t care is in one of the protected
states, then this will allow us to tolerate double errors by design. One error on the
customized module that has the don’t care and one error on any other module.
4.4 Single Output Versus Pair Protection
As we have restricted the use of GMR in this work to deal with a single or pair of
outputs, an investigation has to be made in order to verify the effectiveness of each
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option. To achieve this, the circuit which is described in Figure 4.2 will be used as an
example. This circuit has 6 inputs and 2 outputs. It has a fixed output “01” for all
input patterns except three where the states are “00”, “10”, and “11”. We perform
two protection procedures. In the first one, single output protection is applied to
each output, while in the other the two outputs are protected as a pair. In single
output protection we need to add two redundant modules. For pair protection, we
protect for two states as they require the same area overhead, in terms of redundant
modules, when applying single output protection. The percentage of protected states
at the outputs for both cases is set to be the same. Later, correction logic or
voters are added to obtain the protected outputs. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show the
resulting circuits after applying single and pair protection. M1 and M2 are original
modules, R1 and R2 are replicated modules, C1 and C2 are customized redundant
modules. By analyzing the reliability of each method against soft errors, it is evident
that single output protection is more advantageous, as shown in Figure 4.11. The
size of correction logic, which is significantly larger in pair protection, together
with probability of masking play an important role in this regards. As this logic
has no protection against soft errors, reliability will be degraded as this logic gets
bigger. Also, the reliability of single output protection is better than pair protection
when protecting only one state. This is shown in Figure 4.12. These findings are
consistent for larger circuits. Thus, we will favor single output protection whenever
it is possible.
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Figure 4.9: Original and replicated modules for single protection of the example
circuit along with correction logic.
4.5 Methodology of Applying GMR
From the discussion above, we were able to reach some important conclusions about
critical issues for applying the generalized modular redundancy scheme to increase
combinational circuits’ fault tolerance. These conclusions comprise the following:
• Customized redundant modules will be used when the truth table has a rea-
sonable size (i.e., number of inputs ≤ 15) for both single and pair protection.
Otherwise, module replication will be used for circuits with more than 15
inputs.
• Due to the complexity of the correction logic needed to obtain protected out-
62




















	





	

	

	



	
	

	

	
	






Figure 4.10: Original and customized modules for pair protection of the example
circuit along with correction logic.
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Figure 4.11: Reliability of single protection against pair protection (protecting 2
states).
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Figure 4.12: Reliability of single protection against pair protection (protecting 1
state).
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puts, applying GMR protection will be limited to sub-circuits with one or two
outputs.
• We will favor single output protection whenever it is possible. If not, pair
protection will be used. Otherwise, triple modular redundancy will be applied.
Based on these conclusions, the methodology depicted in Figure 4.13 will be used
to apply GMR for enhancing combinational circuits reliability.
In the initialization step, a protection threshold for identifying dominant states
at the outputs, thr, has to be specified. For a single output, a state will be considered
dominant if the probability of occurrence for this state is greater than the threshold.
However, for pair protection, meeting this threshold might require protecting more
than one state. States with the highest probabilities of occurrence will be protected
such that the sum of their probabilities must exceed protection threshold. A truth
table of the circuit has to be provided also. This table will be used to calculate
probability of occurrence for states at the outputs. For circuits with large number
of inputs, the table will be unacceptably large. Thus, partial truth tables can be
used to estimate probabilities of states at the outputs by simulation.
During evaluation, the probability of occurrence for the dominant state P (Di) at
output i is calculated. Then, output i is paired with other available outputs j and
the probability of occurrence for the dominant state(s) P (Dij) is calculated. As we
may protect more than one state, we keep track of the number of protected states
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thr : Protection threshold for identifying dominant states.
T/PT : Truth table/Partial truth table of the circuit.
Pi(S) : Probability of occurrence of state S at output i .
Pij(S) : Probability of occurrence of state S when pairing outputs i and j .
P (Di) : Probability of the dominant state at output i .
P (Dij) : Probability of the dominant state(s) when pairing outputs i and j .
NPij : Number of protected states when pairing outputs i and j .
Begin
1. Initialization:
2. Set protection threshold thr .
3. Provide T/PT.
4. Evaluation:
5. ForEach output i Do
6. Evaluate probability of occurrence Pi(0), Pi(1).
7. For all other outputs j .
8. Evaluate probability of occurrence Pij(00), Pij(01), Pij(10), Pij(11).
9. Choose best candidate j where thr has been met with minimum NPij .
10. Decision:
11. If P (Di) > thr Then
12. If NPij > 2 Then
13. Apply single protection.
14. Else
15. If P (Di) ≥ P (Dij) Then
16. Apply single protection.
17. Else
18. Apply pair protection.
19. EndIf
20. EndIf
21. Else If NPij ≤ 3 Then
22. Apply pair protection.
23. Else
24. Apply TMR protection.
25. EndIf
26. EndFor
End.
Figure 4.13: Methodology of applying GMR for enhancing combinational circuits
reliability.
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NPij when pairing output i with output j. After that, we choose the best candidate
j for pairing with i such that P (Dij) is greater than thr with minimum value for
NPij .
Next, a decision on the protection scheme has to be made. This includes single
protection, pair protection and TMR. The cost of applying single protection equals
the cost of applying pair protection when the number of protected states NPij is
two. For this reason, the scheme which provides maximum protection will be used,
line 15 in the methodology. If both single protection and pair protection are not
applicable, then TMR will be used to protect the output.
4.6 Illustrative Example
In a standard floating point representation a real number is represented using three
values: a sign bit, mantissa and exponent; the value of the real number is:
r = (−1)sign × 1.mantissa× 2exponent
In this representation, the most significant bit (MSB) of the real number (which
is always 1) is hidden. To add or subtract two floating point numbers, first their
exponents must be aligned by shifting (1.mantissa) of one of the two numbers to
the right. Then the shifted/unshifted (1.mantissa) of the two numbers are added
or subtracted. Since the result of this addition/subtraction may not be of the form
(1.xxx), it is necessary to shift the result to the left until the MSB is 1. This process
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is called Normalization. In order to find the proper shift amount, a leading zero
detector (LZD) is required. The LZD can also detect the cases when the result of
addition is all zeros. So, for example a 24-bit leading zero detector circuit will have
24 inputs and 5 outputs. In this case, the state “00000” has the highest probability
of occurrence followed by “00001” then “00010” and so on.
Let the outputs of this circuit be: out0, out1, out2, out3 and out4 from the left to
the right. To enhance the reliability of this circuit by using the generalized modular
redundancy scheme, we will use the methodology discussed above. At first, we will
set protection threshold, thr, to 0.9 and provide the truth table shown in Figure 4.14.
The algorithm will start with the evaluation step. The probability of having a “1” at
out0 equals to Pout0(1) = 256/2
24, and the probability of having a “0” at this output
equals to Pout0(0) = 1 − Pout0(1) = 0.99998. We can see that Pout0(0) > thr, hence
“0” is the dominant state at out0 and P (Dout0) = Pout0(0). After that, output
out0 is paired with other available outputs (out1, out2, out3 and out4 ) and the
probability of occurrence for the dominant states P (Dij) is calculated. The results
are as follows: P (Dout0 out1) = 0.99609, P (Dout0 out2) = 0.94116, P (Dout0 out3) =
0.79998 and P (Dout0 out4) = 0.66665. We can see that output out1 is the best
candidate for pairing with out0 such that P (Dij) is greater than thr with minimum
value for NPij , where P (Dij) = P (Dout0 out1) with NPout0 out1 = 1.
At the decision step we have the following: P (Dout0) > thr, NPout0 out1 < 2 and
P (Dout0) > P (Dout0 out1). As a result, out0 will be protected as a single output.
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The same process will be repeated for out1 and out2. They also will be protected
as single outputs.
At this point, we are left out with out3 and out4. The evaluation step for
out3 results in the following: Pout3(1) = 0.2, Pout3(0) = 1 − Pout3(1) = 0.8 and
Pout3(0) < thr. There is no dominant state at out3 as we have set the thr to
0.9. When pairing out3 with the only output left out4, the resulting dominant
state P (Dout3 out4) equals to 0.933 with the number of protected states, NPout3 out4 ,
equals to 3. At the decision step we have: P (Dout3) < thr, P (Dout3 out4) > thr and
NPout3 out4 = 3. As a result, out3 will be protected as a pair along with out4. By
using GMR scheme, we are able to reduce area overhead by 4 modules; out0, out1
and out2 require one extra module for each as they are protected as single outputs;
out3 and out4 are protected as pair and they require 3 extra modules as the number
of protected states is 3. So, we ended up with 11 modules. However, protecting this
circuit by TMR will require 5× 3 = 15 modules. Detailed reliability figures will be
discussed later in Chapter 6.
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.i 24
.o 5
.ilb A23 A22 A21 A20 A19 A18 A17 A16 A15 A14 A13
A12 A11 A10 A9 A8 A7 A6 A5 A4 A3 A2 A1 A0
.ob out0 out1 out2 out3 out4
.p 25
1----------------------- 00000
01---------------------- 00001
001--------------------- 00010
0001-------------------- 00011
00001------------------- 00100
000001------------------ 00101
0000001----------------- 00110
00000001---------------- 00111
000000001--------------- 01000
0000000001-------------- 01001
00000000001------------- 01010
000000000001------------ 01011
0000000000001----------- 01100
00000000000001---------- 01101
000000000000001--------- 01110
0000000000000001-------- 01111
00000000000000001------- 10000
000000000000000001------ 10001
0000000000000000001----- 10010
00000000000000000001---- 10011
000000000000000000001--- 10100
0000000000000000000001-- 10101
00000000000000000000001- 10110
000000000000000000000001 10111
000000000000000000000000 11000
.e
Figure 4.14: Actual file describing the truth table of the leading zero detector circuit.
Chapter 5
Experimental Setup & Framework
5.1 Benchmarks
In this work, LGSynth911 benchmarks circuits are used. These contain a set of
circuits with various sizes, in terms of size of the logic, and number of inputs and
outputs, see Table 5.1.
5.2 Fault Model and Injection Mechanism
In our work, we assume a stuck-open and stuck-short fault models at the transistor
level. Faults can be injected at any transistor; stuck-open means that the transistor
is stuck at the OFF state, while stuck-short means that it is stuck at the ON
1http://www.cbl.ncsu.edu:16080/benchmarks/LGSynth91/
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Benchmark Number of inputs Number of outputs
5xp1 7 10
alu4 14 8
apex1 45 43
apex2 39 3
apex3 54 50
apex4 9 19
b12 15 9
clip 9 5
cordic 23 2
duke2 22 29
ex5p 8 63
misex2 25 18
misex3 14 14
sao2 10 4
seq 41 35
table3 14 14
table5 17 15
vg2 25 8
z5xp1 7 10
Table 5.1: Benchmarks circuits.
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state. The transistor level is used as soft errors usually alter the state of individual
transistors.
In case of a stuck-open fault, the gate of the transistor at which the fault is
injected is connected to GND for NMOS transistors and to VDD for PMOS transis-
tors. For stuck-short faults, the gate of the transistor at which the fault is injected
is connected to VDD for NMOS transistors and to GND for PMOS transistors. This
is shown in Figure 5.1. In each simulation iteration, a single or multiple faults are
injected randomly, stuck-open or stuck-short is randomly applied to these faulty
transistors.

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Figure 5.1: Stuck-open and stuck-short fault models.
5.3 Measuring Reliability of Circuits
For evaluating circuit failure probability and reliability, we adopt the simulation-
based reliability model used in [47]. We compare circuit reliability based on the
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generalized modular redundancy scheme with TMR.
To compute the circuit failure probability, Fm, resulting from injecting m defec-
tive transistors, we use the following procedure:
1. Set the number of iterations to be performed, I, to 10000 and the number of
failed simulations, K, to 0.
2. Simulate the fault-free circuit by applying a random test vector T .
3. Randomly inject m transistor defects.
4. Simulate the faulty circuit by applying the test vector T .
5. If the outputs of the fault-free and faulty circuits are different, increment K
by 1.
6. Decrement I by 1 and if I is not 0 goto step 3.
7. Failure Rate Fm = K/10000.
Assuming that every transistor has the same defect probability, P , and that
defects are randomly and independently distributed, the probability of having a
number ofm defective transistors in a circuit with N transistors follows the binomial
distribution [47] as shown in Eq. 5.1.
P (m) =
(
N
m
)
Pm × (1− P )N−m (5.1)
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Assuming the number of transistor defects, m, as a random variable and using
the circuit failure probability Fm as a failure distribution in m, the probability of
circuit failure, F , and circuit reliability, R, are computed as in Eq. 5.2 and Eq. 5.3.
F =
N∑
m=0
Fm × P (m) (5.2)
R = 1− F = 1−
N∑
m=0
Fm × P (m) (5.3)
Reliability estimation of combinational circuits can be achieved by measuring
their failure rates. Failure rate is the percentage of which a circuit will produce
faulty output when a fault is injected in the logic. This way, reliability of a circuit
is reciprocally proportional to its failure rate.
5.4 Tools
Many tools are used for different purposes. They comprise:
Espresso: For logic minimization [48].
SIS: For logic minimization and synthesis [46]. The following commands are used
for both modules and correction logic:
1. espresso.
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2. fx.
3. read library “Library”2.
4. map.
ModelSim: Used for simulation at the transistor level [49]. Benchmarks are trans-
lated from Bench format to Verilog. Then, ModelSim is used to evaluate the
reliability of both unprotected and protected versions of the benchmarks.
5.5 Work Flow
We start by providing the protection threshold at the outputs and a truth table
or partial truth table for circuits with large number of inputs (more than 16 in
this work). The truth table is introduced in espresso pla file format. After that,
we evaluate probability of occurrence for states at the outputs. Based on this, a
decision will be made on how to protect the output under processing. Evaluation
and decision steps will be repeated until all primary outputs have been processed.
Next, redundant modules followed by voters to obtain the protected outputs will
be introduced to the logic. Eventually, we synthesize the logic such that no logic
sharing is allowed among different modules. This is achieved by synthesizing each
module alone. Then, we combine these synthesized modules together along with the
2It includes an inverter along with nand and nor gates with 2, 3 and 4 inputs.
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voters. The final protected synthesized version of circuit will be in bench format.
Figure 5.2 depicts the flow for applying the generalized modular redundancy scheme.
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Figure 5.2: Work flow for applying the generalized modular redundancy scheme.
Chapter 6
Experimental Results &
Discussion
6.1 Analyzing Benchmarks
We have seen the methodology of applying GMR to enhance combinational circuits’
reliability in Chapter 4. We have also seen cases where the use of GMR is particularly
beneficial (general comparator and equality comparator) in Chapter 3. In order to
investigate the applicability of the proposed methodology, it will be applied on
the set of benchmarks presented in Chapter 5. We examine different values of
protection threshold thr. Then, for each value, we evaluate the number of protected
modules in the following categories: single output protection, pair protection and
triple modular redundancy. We also list the number of protected states for outputs
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that are protected as pairs. Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 summarize this evaluation.
Protection threshold thr can take values in the range [0, 1]. A value of zero
means that no protection is applied. A value of one means that all states at the
primary outputs are protected, i.e., TMR will be applied as TMR is the special
case of GMR where all states at the primary outputs are protected. As the value of
thr drops below one, the number of modules protected by TMR will also decrease.
These modules will be protected by GMR as singles or pairs. This is clearly visible in
“apex4” benchmark where the number of modules protected by TMR has dropped
from 10 to 1.
In most of the cases, the number of modules which are protected by TMR is
considerably low. In fact, a good number of cases like: “misex2”, “misex3”, “table3”,
“table5”, “duke2” and “ex5p” have almost no modules protected as TMR. This
enables us to exploit the advantage of GMR where decent reliability figures are
achieved while saving area overhead. For few benchmarks like “clip” and “5xp1”
TMR is used despite the reduction of thr down to 0.75. For such cases no or limited
area savings can be achieved.
From this analysis, we can see that the proposed methodology of applying GMR
to increase fault tolerance of combinational circuits is very encouraging. In the
next section, reliability that corresponds to different protection thresholds will be
inspected for some benchmarks.
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Table 6.1: Analyzing benchmarks at different protection thresholds (1).
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Table 6.2: Analyzing benchmarks at different protection thresholds (2).
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Table 6.3: Analyzing benchmarks at different protection thresholds (3).
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6.2 Evaluating Reliability at Different Protection
Thresholds
We have seen how changing protection threshold, thr, can affect protection scheme at
the outputs. However, as the value of thr goes smaller it affects the overall reliability
of the protected version of the circuit. Thus, the value of thr has to stay at high
values to insure that the reliability of the protected circuits stays at acceptable rate.
Figure 6.1 depicts changing in overall reliability of “apex4” benchmark in response
to different protection thresholds. It is evident that the circuit with the highest
protection threshold (0.95) has the best reliability. At thr equals to 0.9, decent
reliability figures are achieved accompanied by remarkable overhead savings. By
decreasing the value of thr we can notice the corresponding reduction in reliability.
Table 6.4 shows the reliability of the original circuit “apex4”, protected versions at
different protection thresholds using GMR, and protected version using TMR along
with their area overhead. It is evident that at thresholds higher than 0.8, GMR is
able to achieve higher reliability figures than that of TMR along with decent savings
in area overhead.
At protection threshold equals to 0.95, 8 outputs are protected as 4 pairs and 1
output is protected as a single output. In each pair of outputs, we protect 3 out of 4
states which requires 3 redundant modules. The total savings in area overhead are
5 modules (4 in pair protection + 1 in single protection). Moreover, the existence of
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don’t cares in the customized redundant modules (which is used in pair protection)
increases fault tolerance of protected circuits. If we don’t care about the output
of a redundant module, this means that, in this particular case, we can mask the
error without referring to that redundant module. So, no matter if an error hits
that module or not, we still can obtain a correct output. For example, in one of
the customized modules within this circuit, more than 68% of the minterms are
don’t cares. These don’t cares can significantly boost the reliability of the protected
circuit. In addition to its higher area overhead, TMR protection lacks the advantage
of the don’t cares within the redundant modules. For these reasons, TMR falls
short behind GMR even at thr equals to 0.8, where 20% of states at the outputs
are not protected. At protection threshold equals to 0.9, we are able to save 4 more
modules. When thr equals to 0.8, the total of 13 modules are saved as against
TMR protection. However, decreasing protection threshold results in the use of pair
protection to protect four pair of outputs, where three states are protected, rather
than TMR (as shown in Table 6.1). Away form savings in area overhead, this will
have a negative effect as the correction logic when protecting three states is larger
than the majority voters, and probability of masking for this logic is less. Therefore,
due to the sacrifice made when protection threshold is reduced along with previously
stated reasons, the reliability at 0.95 is better than that at 0.9 and lower.
Figure 6.2 and Table 6.5 show reliability results for “ex5p” benchmark. By
analyzing these results, the same findings from previous example can be extracted.
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Figure 6.1: Reliability of “apex4” benchmark at different protection thresholds.
Prob. of
transistor
failure
Reliability
Original thr = 0.8 thr = 0.9 thr = 0.95 TMR
7.499E-05 0.9141 0.9855 0.9917 0.9973 0.9924
1.500E-04 0.8294 0.9725 0.9807 0.9913 0.9809
3.749E-04 0.6351 0.9157 0.9411 0.9636 0.9225
7.499E-04 0.4029 0.8152 0.847 0.8907 0.7702
1.125E-03 0.2536 0.6861 0.7449 0.7976 0.6041
1.500E-03 0.1621 0.5763 0.6332 0.6912 0.452
Overhead 100.00% 253.18% 259.67% 298.41% 303.70%
Table 6.4: Reliability of “apex4” benchmark at different protection thresholds.
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When thr equals to 0.95, reliability is at its best; however, overhead savings is
not significant. At lower threshold rates, major overhead savings is achieved on
the price of sacrificing reliability. This circuit has a large number of outputs (63).
As a result, the number of voters and their area overhead will highly affect the
reliability of this circuit as the logic of these voters is not protected. Moreover,
module sizes in this circuit are considerably small. This will reduce the overall
reliability of the protected version of the circuit. Due to the previously discussed
reasons, we can see that even after using TMR to protect the circuit, the reliability
of the circuit is worse than its reliability without protection. However, the case
is better for GMR at high protection thresholds. So, a trade off has to be made
between reliability and overhead saving. In the rest of this work, a thr equals to
0.9 will be used. Table 6.6 presents number of module savings at thr equals to 0.9
when compared to TMR. A maximum overhead reduction of 33% can be achieved
when we duplicate all modules instead of triplicating them. This corresponds to the
analysis performed earlier in Section 6.1. For some benchmarks with large number
of inputs, like “apex1”, “apex3” and “seq”, area overhead savings are limited due
to the use of module replication solely. For instance, we are able to save 25 modules
instead of 33 in “seq” circuit.
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Figure 6.2: Reliability of “ex5p” benchmark at different protection thresholds.
Prob. of
transistor
failure
Reliability
Original thr = 0.8 thr = 0.85 thr = 0.9 thr = 0.95 TMR
3.668E-04 0.9597 0.9507 0.958 0.9696 0.9785 0.9237
7.337E-04 0.9215 0.8984 0.9196 0.9433 0.9594 0.8484
1.834E-03 0.8113 0.7704 0.8086 0.8579 0.8956 0.6612
3.668E-03 0.6571 0.5956 0.6529 0.7204 0.7923 0.4222
5.503E-03 0.5389 0.4636 0.5218 0.6138 0.6917 0.2668
7.337E-03 0.4496 0.3554 0.4215 0.5081 0.5964 0.1707
Overhead 100.00% 225.09% 235.73% 262.22% 285.99% 360.09%
Table 6.5: Reliability of “ex5p” benchmark at different protection thresholds.
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Benchmark
Module
savings
Total num.
of modules
(TMR)
Reduction
5xp1 1 30 3%
alu4 3 24 13%
apex1 25 129 19%
apex2 2 9 22%
apex3 42 150 28%
apex4 9 57 16%
b12 6 27 22%
clip 0 15 0%
cordic 2 6 33%
duke2 29 87 33%
ex5p 62 189 33%
misex2 17 54 31%
misex3 13 42 31%
sao2 3 12 25%
seq 25 105 24%
table3 14 42 33%
table5 15 45 33%
vg2 4 24 17%
z5xp1 1 30 3%
Table 6.6: Total module savings & reduction percentages compared to TMR at thr
equals to 0.9.
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6.3 Effectiveness of Single Output Protection
We have seen in Section 3.4 that equality comparator serves as an excellent example
for protecting single output circuits. The probability of having a “1” at its output is:
Prob(1) = 0.015, while the probability of having a “0” equals to: Prob(0) = 0.985.
Protecting the state which is vulnerable to soft errors the most involves adding
one extra module, as opposed to TMR wherein we need two redundant modules.
Despite protecting only one state at the output, the reliability of the circuit is greater
than its reliability when protected using TMR. This is clearly evident in Figure 6.3.
Reliability figures and area overhead are shown in Table 6.7.
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Figure 6.3: Reliability of 6-bit equality comparator with single output protection.
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Prob. of
transistor
failure
Reliability
Original Single protection TMR
1.587E-03 0.8508 0.9871 0.9464
3.175E-03 0.7327 0.9391 0.8226
7.937E-03 0.45 0.7007 0.4282
1.587E-02 0.2054 0.3658 0.1068
2.381E-02 0.0849 0.1725 0.0238
3.175E-02 0.0433 0.0762 0.0094
Overhead 100.00% 200.95% 304.13%
Table 6.7: Reliability of 6-bit equality comparator with single output protection.
6.4 Effectiveness of Pair Protection
We have seen in section 3.5 that the digital comparator serves as an excellent example
for pair protection. The protection will be applied to states which are vulnerable
to soft errors the most, namely states “10” and “01”. By protecting these states,
more than 93% of soft errors will be masked. Since only three states appear at the
outputs of the comparator, protecting these three states provides full protection for
this circuit. In contrast to TMR, where all four possible states are protected using
module replication, protecting the three states that might actually happen by adding
customized redundant modules can achieve the same protection level provided by
TMR which is a 100%. However, due to the remarkable savings in area overhead,
the reliability of pair protection is considerably greater than the reliability of TMR,
as the failure rate is proportional to the area of the circuit. Figure 6.4 shows the
reliability of the digital comparator when protecting two and three states using
GMR, and when protecting all states using TMR. It is clear from Table 6.8 that
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even protecting only 2 out of 3 states is better than TMR thanks to savings in area
overhead.
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Figure 6.4: Reliability of 4-bit general comparator with pair protection.
Prob. of
transistor
failure
Reliability
Original
Protecting
2 states
Protecting
3 states
TMR
3.226E-03 0.9028 0.9666 0.9832 0.96
6.452E-03 0.8124 0.9158 0.9438 0.8939
1.613E-02 0.5918 0.753 0.8037 0.6211
3.226E-02 0.361 0.4903 0.562 0.2822
4.839E-02 0.2161 0.3048 0.3632 0.1172
6.452E-02 0.1305 0.1959 0.2333 0.0493
Overhead 100.00% 200.65% 222.58% 316.77%
Table 6.8: Reliability of 4-bit general comparator with pair protection.
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6.5 Effectiveness of GMR Protection
In Section 4.6, we have seen a complete example for applying the GMR protection
scheme to enhance the reliability of the leading zero detection circuit. Protecting this
circuit using GMR exploits its advantages where both single and pair protection are
applied. At protection threshold equals to 0.9, three out of five outputs are protected
as single outputs, while the remaining two are protected as pair. A remarkable
savings in area overhead is achieved, and reliability of GMR is greater than that of
TMR. Figure 6.5 and Table 6.9 demonstrate this.
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Figure 6.5: Reliability of 24-bit leading zero detector.
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Prob. of
transistor
failure
Reliability
Original thr = 0.9 TMR
1.786E-03 0.8558 0.97 0.9413
3.571E-03 0.7457 0.9284 0.8536
8.929E-03 0.483 0.767 0.5752
1.786E-02 0.2164 0.4783 0.2177
2.679E-02 0.107 0.2718 0.0693
3.571E-02 0.0443 0.1345 0.0196
Overhead 100.00% 227.50% 323.21%
Table 6.9: Reliability of 24-bit leading zero detector.
6.6 Reliability of Other Benchmarks at thr Equals
to 0.9
In this section, we report reliability results of applying GMR protection, with thr
equals to 0.9, to the set of benchmarks used in this work. We compare these results
with the reliability of applying TMR protection. In Table 6.10, we report the reli-
ability results obtained based on the simulation procedure outlined in Section 5.3
for the generalized modular redundancy scheme for several transistor defect prob-
abilities based on stuck-open and stuck-short defects. In Table 6.11, we report the
reliability results for the triple modular redundancy scheme. The effectiveness of
the generalized modular redundancy scheme is clearly demonstrated by the results
as it achieves higher circuit reliability when compared to that of triple modular re-
dundancy. This is in addition to the observation that the GMR scheme requires less
area overhead as indicated in the tables. These reliability figures have been achieved
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Benchmarks
Generalized Modular Redundancy
#Trans. 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.001 0.002 0.005 Overhead
alu4 17538 0.999 0.992 0.957 0.866 0.659 0.230 243.85%
apex1 38852 0.991 0.968 0.871 0.704 0.356 0.030 287.62%
apex2 23590 0.992 0.968 0.761 0.426 0.141 0.015 245.22%
apex3 25878 0.992 0.974 0.909 0.757 0.464 0.046 278.08%
apex4 34630 0.988 0.973 0.913 0.779 0.447 0.020 259.67%
b12 1818 0.999 0.997 0.993 0.984 0.960 0.866 394.35%
cordic 14204 0.987 0.955 0.809 0.541 0.199 0.013 200.17%
duke2 8410 0.997 0.993 0.981 0.958 0.898 0.688 240.29%
ex5p 7148 0.991 0.983 0.960 0.924 0.845 0.641 262.22%
misex2 1404 0.997 0.994 0.986 0.972 0.945 0.867 244.60%
misex3 30086 0.994 0.982 0.907 0.729 0.316 0.008 208.87%
sao2 1870 0.999 0.998 0.995 0.986 0.963 0.868 201.51%
seq 47000 0.991 0.974 0.882 0.646 0.282 0.018 241.05%
table3 18884 0.994 0.988 0.962 0.892 0.698 0.188 207.43%
table5 20424 0.994 0.990 0.961 0.882 0.703 0.188 209.82%
vg2 3692 0.999 0.999 0.996 0.980 0.933 0.737 265.61%
Table 6.10: Reliability and area overhead of benchmarks for the GMR scheme with
0.9 protection.
thanks to reduction in overall area overhead due to reduction in total number of re-
quired redundant modules and the use of customized redundant modules.
For benchmarks with minimal savings in area overhead and where the size of
modules is considerably small, the addition of voters to obtain protected outputs
may cancel the savings. Sometimes, the total overhead of using GMR with such
benchmarks may exceed the overhead of using TMR especially when pair protection
is used which requires larger voters.
“b12” benchmark is an example of such circuits. From Table 6.10 and Table 6.11
we can see that area overhead when using GMR is greater than the overhead when
TMR is used. Despite the increase of total overhead, reliability of GMR is still
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Benchmarks
Triple Modular Redundancy
#Trans. 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.001 0.002 0.005 Overhead
alu4 21784 0.995 0.981 0.902 0.716 0.387 0.119 302.89%
apex1 41642 0.982 0.943 0.821 0.624 0.271 0.013 308.28%
apex2 28938 0.991 0.938 0.650 0.286 0.055 0.007 300.81%
apex3 29218 0.978 0.934 0.815 0.597 0.278 0.017 313.97%
apex4 40502 0.989 0.971 0.877 0.659 0.302 0.008 303.70%
b12 1614 0.997 0.995 0.986 0.971 0.939 0.832 350.87%
cordic 21340 0.984 0.917 0.650 0.321 0.107 0.013 300.73%
duke2 11254 0.978 0.960 0.916 0.830 0.650 0.276 321.54%
ex5p 9816 0.980 0.959 0.896 0.798 0.636 0.302 360.09%
misex2 2190 0.991 0.982 0.956 0.912 0.827 0.605 381.53%
misex3 43576 0.985 0.953 0.776 0.423 0.077 0.001 302.53%
sao2 2888 0.998 0.996 0.987 0.969 0.920 0.727 311.21%
seq 59404 0.980 0.953 0.766 0.454 0.095 0.000 304.67%
table3 27676 0.990 0.973 0.919 0.784 0.485 0.040 304.00%
table5 29592 0.989 0.974 0.918 0.777 0.472 0.047 304.01%
vg2 4378 0.995 0.989 0.969 0.930 0.858 0.683 314.96%
Table 6.11: Reliability and area overhead of benchmarks for the TMR scheme.
better than that of TMR. This can be attributed to the existence of don’t cares in
the customized redundant modules.
The only weak spot of a protected circuit is the voter which is added to obtain
the protected outputs. As the size of this vulnerable part increases, reliability will
degrade due to errors in this part of the circuit which is not protected. So, it
is favorable to have voters which are as small as possible; like the voter in single
output protection which is only one gate.
The existence of don’t cares in the customized redundant modules increases fault
tolerance of protected circuits. If we don’t care about the output of a redundant
module, this means that, in this particular case, we can mask the error without
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referring to that redundant module. So, no matter if an error hits that module or
not, we still can obtain a correct output.
6.7 Protecting Voters
In order to increase the fault tolerance of the error-prone voters different techniques
have been proposed. A cascade NMR or TMR scheme is offered using redundant
voters to reduce the probability of circuit failure in the voter [42] [50]. The TMR
process can be repeated by combining three of the TMR units with another majority
voter to form a second-order TMR unit with even higher reliability. Another tech-
nique that adds redundancy at the transistor level and provides built-in immunity
to stuck-open, stuck-short and bridges defects has also been proposed by El-Maleh
et al. [6]. This technique is based on replacing each transistor by N2-transistor
structure (N ≥ 2) that guarantees defect tolerance of all N − 1 defects. It pro-
vides significantly less circuit failure probability and higher reliability than other
techniques based on gate level (quadded logic) and unit level (TMR).
To investigate the effect of protecting voters on the overall reliability of the circuit
the second technique will be used [6]. Figure 6.6 shows the advantage of protecting
voters in both cases where GMR and TMR were used for a 4-bit general comparator.
We can clearly notice the benefit of protecting these voters and how they affect the
overall reliability of the circuit, see Table 6.12. The overall area overhead of applying
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Figure 6.6: Reliability of 4-bit general comparator with/without voter protection.
GMR and protecting voters for a digital comparator equals to the area overhead of
applying TMR to that circuit. However, there is a huge improvement in reliability
between these two cases. So, by utilizing the savings in area overhead achieved by
GMR in protecting the voters, we can make the most of the generalized modular
redundancy in terms of both reliability and area overhead.
Figure 6.7 shows reliability of “ex5p” benchmark before and after protecting
voters in both cases where GMR and TMR were used. We have seen earlier, in
Section 6.2, that this circuit has a large number of outputs (63) and its module sizes
are considerably small. As a result, the number of voters and their area overhead will
highly affect the reliability of this circuit as the logic of these voters is not protected.
Even after using TMR to protect the circuit, the reliability became worse than its
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Prob. of
transistor
failure
Reliability
Protect 3 states
(no voter prot.)
Protect 3 states
(voter prot.)
TMR (no
voter prot.)
TMR (voter
prot.)
3.226E-03 0.9832 0.9951 0.96 0.9897
6.452E-03 0.9438 0.9785 0.8939 0.956
1.613E-02 0.8037 0.8815 0.6211 0.7837
3.226E-02 0.562 0.6753 0.2822 0.470
4 4.839E-02 0.3632 0.5072 0.1172 0.2504
6.452E-02 0.2333 0.3789 0.0493 0.1313
Overhead 222.58% 316.77% 317.42% 367.10%
Table 6.12: Reliability of 4-bit general comparator with/without voter protection.
reliability without protection. However, we can notice the improvement in reliability
for TMR after protecting the correction logic. Despite the fact that reliability has
improved dramatically, area overhead has also increased to a great extent. This
dramatic increase in reliability for TMR can be attributed to the following reasons:
(1) large number of voters which corresponds to the large number of outputs in the
circuit, (2) relatively large size of majority voters, (3) lower masking probability as
opposed to the correction logic for pair protection when only two states are protected
for all pairs. When thr equals to 0.9, the increase in reliability when protecting the
correction logic is not as much as that of TMR. This is due to smaller size and better
masking probability of the correction logic as outputs are protected as singles or pairs
with 2 states to protect. From Table 6.13, we can see that the overall area overhead
of applying GMR and protecting correction logic for the “ex5p” benchmark equals
to the area overhead of applying TMR. However, there is a substantial improvement
in reliability when the GMR scheme is used.
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Figure 6.7: Reliability of “ex5p” benchmark with/without voter protection.
Prob. of
transistor
failure
Reliability
thr = 0.9
thr = 0.9 (voter
protection)
TMR
TMR (voter
protection)
3.668E-04 0.9696 0.9854 0.9237 0.9999
7.337E-04 0.9433 0.9767 0.8484 0.9997
1.834E-03 0.8579 0.9267 0.6612 0.9880
3.668E-03 0.7204 0.8504 0.4222 0.9510
5.503E-03 0.6138 0.7814 0.2668 0.9047
7.337E-03 0.5081 0.7070 0.1707 0.8347
Overhead 262.22% 365.88% 360.09% 540.35%
Table 6.13: Reliability of “ex5p” benchmark with/without voter protection.
Chapter 7
Conclusion & Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
In this work, a generalized modular redundancy scheme to enhance the reliability
of combinational logic circuits against soft errors has been proposed. It is based on
probability of occurrence for states at the outputs of these circuits. An investigation
on different aspects regarding the application of the generalized modular redundancy
scheme has been done. This includes types of redundant modules, complexity of
voters and single versus multiple outputs protection.
Furthermore, a methodology for applying the generalized modular redundancy
scheme to increase the reliability of combinational logic circuits has been developed.
Reliability analysis for various benchmark circuits shows that the proposed method-
ology can achieve reliability figures higher than that of triple modular redundancy.
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Generally, remarkable overhead savings are also accomplished in addition to that
superior reliability. Moreover, reliability of the correction logic can be increased by
utilizing the attained overhead savings. This way, the overall reliability of the circuit
can be further promoted to higher levels while maintaining low area overhead.
7.2 Future Work
As a future work, as investigation regarding the incorporation of the following tech-
niques could be done:
• Incorporation of synthesis techniques which target maximizing the masking
property in the logic. This can be applied to synthesize individual modules in
a circuit. By maximizing the masking property in the logic, we are increasing
the reliability of the modules themselves against soft errors. After that, the
generalized modular redundancy scheme can be applied to take care of non-
maskable errors.
• Synthesis of customized redundant modules based on partial truth tables for
circuits with large number of inputs, even though this will not guarantee mask-
ing of all faults.
• Combining the generalized modular redundancy scheme with cluster sharing
reduction.
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